INTRODUCTION
The importance of safety and loss prevention has been underlined by a number of major chemical disasters. Those at Feyzin (1966) , Flixborough (1974) , Seveso (1976 ), Mexico City (1984 , Bhopal (1984 ), Schweitzerhall Basel (1986 ), Port Herriot Lyon (1987 , Pasadena (1989) 
WHY TO TEACH SAFETY IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING?
Harvey (1984) has stated the justification to include safety in chemical engineering curriculum as following: «It is important that students be introduced to the concept of inherently safer design and that they realize that safety in plant operation must be considered right at the start of the design study. Process safety must be taught in a rigorous, stimulating way by staff of appropriate experience. Departments which initially do not have this expertise may need to use the services of experts from other universities, industry and consulting firms. By virtue of the nature of processes which give rise to major hazards, it is the chemical engineer who often fills the position of responsible person in the design or operation of plant». Kletz (1988) advanced three principal arguments to support this view. One is the importance of treating safety from the outset as an integral part of the design of plant and of aiming for inherently safer design. Another is that whatever use he may make of other subjects taught at university, any practising chemical engineer will be involved in safety matters. He has a moral and legal responsibility and will probably be faced with issues from the first day. The third is that safety and loss prevention involve basic principles.
The extent to which safety and loss prevention rank as a mainstream subject in chemical engineering has been examined by Marshall (1991) . He argues that to qualify a subject must meet the following criteria. It should:
(a) be acknowledged as such by academic culture, (b) be recognized as relevant by students, (c) be intellectually demanding, (d) comprise a well established corpus of knowledge, organized on clearly defined unifying principles, (e) be highly quantitative and thus capable of being subjected to mathematical analysis, (f) possess a content and unifying principles set out in authoritative textbooks, (g) be taught by specialists, (h) be a compulsory subject which must normally passed and (i) be examined formally.
He goes on to consider the extent to which safety and loss prevention now meet these criteria.
WHEN TO TEACH SAFETY IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING?
As Europe is implementing the Bologna three cycle degrees system, it would be useful to present the survey for a French "Safety, Health and Environment" education in a Bologna type study organization. This three stages structure will also facilitate one of the goals of Bologna process such as more and simple exchange in Europe during studies. The French existing structure is based on three main cycles of Licence -Master -Doctorate (LMD) equivalent to Bachelor's - The two semesters L5 and L6 of the French departments are equivalent to the two last semesters of the three years first degree. The four semesters M1 to M4 correspond with the two years second degree. The teaching approach of SHE is then developed during the three years of the curriculum. At the present time, the inclusion of safety and loss prevention over the three year period of the curriculum is shown in table (I). (Lees, 1996; IChemE, 1990) . More such treatment is unlikely to get across the unifying principles. At the present time this way is ever in France the most difficult to implement because the lack of faculty members with sufficient background and interest to teach such material.
SAFETY TOPICS REGULAR SUBJECTS
These latter arguments have weight and the tendency appears to be promoting a separate course on safety. In this second way, teaching a separate full course, the above disadvantages would disappear; the course would be more coherent and could better coordinate. We believe that the main advantage of a separate course is that such course can concentrate on the subject and especially present a systemic approach.
WHAT TO TEACH SAFETY IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING?
The answer is not trivial. As a matter of fact the fundamental problem lies in the basically "vertical" training given to chemical engineers, since those are taught in narrow and well-defined specialised fields. Now HSE definitely requires a horizontal approach: there is a need for such a horizontal vision and integration of knowledge and expertise. This suggests actions to be taken to make trainers aware of this multidisciplinary approach. In practice, chemical engineers have to consider complex situations involving different disciplines. Therefore, training is moving progressively to a more integrated approach, involving concepts from a number of disciplines (including social sciences and humanities) to expand the perspectives of chemical engineers and to promote a multidisciplinary approach to decision-making. At first we introduce an initiation with many examples of systemic approach and particularly the systemic model of hazard (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001 ).
To treat a phenomenon perceived as a complex system consists to establish the fact that the knowledge of this phenomenon is subordinated to the knowledge of the parts that make the whole, of the interactions between these parts, of the interactions with the environment and of the objectives of the observer or actor of the whole. The systemic approach proposes methodological principles for the investigation of natural and artificial systems with the aim of improving their conception, their functioning and their management. The Analysis Methodology for Malfunctions in Systems (acronym MADS in French) model consider installation, hardware, software, humans, management decision-making and organizational design as an integrated whole. The hazard analysis techniques based on this expanded model provide a means for obtaining the information necessary to design safety into the system and to determine the most critical parameters to monitor during the operations and how to respond to them. The reference model called "hazard process" put into relation a danger source system and a target system by means of a hazard flux within an active environmental field. (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001) .
Figure (3) shows a schematic view of the reference model of hazard process (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001) . Our detailed list of course topics is similar to many accounts of practice in particular safety courses given in the literature (Kletz, 1984; Kaufmann, 1987; Crowl and Louvar, 1988; Levitzky, 1988; Fleischman, 1988; Gupta, 1989; Nolan, 1989; Fleischman, 1991; Laurent, 1993; King, 1998; Sheppard, 1998; Louvar and Hendershot, 2003; Papadki, 2007 and Ferjencik, 2007) . The content of the core course was proposed in agreement with the safety and environmental guidelines recommended by the Accreditation Committee of the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE, 1990) . The Safety Health and Environment Committee (SHEPC) of IChemE decided to promote a matrix approach that divided the topics into basic principles and design project, special topics as well as integral with other topics, mandatory integral, mandatory separate and optional topics (Smith, 1997) . In the same way the comparison of the main content is similar with the too much detailed guidance entitled « Lehrprofil Sicherheitstechnik » proposed by the Dechema / GVC Committee « Sicherheitstechnik in Chemieanlagen » (Dechema/GVC, 1997). At last our proposed safety curriculum complies with the recommendations on the one hand of the simplified guide of the EFCE Working Party Education (Gillett, 2001 ) and on the other hand of the ECTS Bologna scheme (Pohorecki, 2005 ).
An example of the content of the core compulsory courses delivered in 2007 during the semester M2 at ENSIC Nancy is presented in During this curriculum the students can obtain the certificate of first-aid worker. The organization of this certification, validated by the ministry for health, is at the ENSIC Nancy under the responsibility of the students association. The courses related to this possible certificate validation are fully integrated in the ENSIACET Toulouse curriculum.
WHICH TEACHERS TO TEACH SAFETY IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING?
The three departments presented in this document use three different strategies. The ENSIC Nancy decided to integrate this curriculum, and after having used during a few years outside contributors (industrial) decided to compose a teaching team of four teachers. Nowadays 95% of the courses are carried out by this team.
The ENSGTI Pau shares its curriculum 50/50 between courses carried out by teachers of its department and conferences carried out by industrialists.
The courses of the ENSIACET Toulouse are mainly carried out by lecturers external to the department.
WHAT DEPTH TO TEACH SAFETY IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING?
We adapted one practical answer proposed by J.E. Gillett, then by S. F. de Azevedo to teach chemical engineering (Gillett, 2001; Azevedo, 2001) . It was to consider SHE subjects in elements that reflected three stages of learning. The first stage is to provide a basic awareness (beginner level), a second stage to provide an increasing appreciation sufficient to work with subjects experts (practical level) and the third stage to provide the level of full understanding and expertise (expert level). The idea of considering these three levels may have helped with SHE curriculum design and also have utilized to introduce difficult SHE subjects gradually to assist a deeper better understanding. Like this the core SHE subjects, as for example basic concepts and risk analysis methodology, had to be taught in depth.
WHAT TEACHING AIDS TO USE FOR SAFETY?
For the particular subjects of HSE we used many aids to teaching available that can be categorized as follows:
-Vicarious experience: books (Crowl and Louvar, 1990; Kletz, 1990; Lees, 1996;  AIChE/CCPS books and Laurent, 2003) , videos (IChemE packages; AIChE SACHE materials) films, sound recording…used to generate awareness and for short term arousal during long teaching sessions.
-Models: laboratory experiments, demonstrations, case studies, project work, computerized models (Cameo, 1993), sequenced exercises, examples…widely used to provide insight and understanding of deeper knowledge.
-Dramatizations: films, novels, role playing (Verdel, 2006) …used to provide insight into subjective issues and to develop mindset.
-Automatic teaching devices: programmed learning modules (Perilhon, 1998; Fouchecourt, 2005) , computerised teaching machines…best used for routine knowledge and procedures.
A first mandatory worker's training (one month at the end of the first year) and a second mandatory industrial training (4 to 6 months at the end of the second year) are another different and further approach to bringing HSE into the curriculum.
CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL PROSPECTS IN THE FRENCH FUTURE SAFETY EDUCATION
The education of chemical engineers in the principles of safety has been a priority in France for fifteen years. Although the integration of safety with chemical engineering education is important, it has not been sufficiently wide spread. It has been noted that a barrier to better integration safety is the already crowded nature of chemical engineering curricula and the continued pressure for the inclusion of new materials. There appears to be obstacles at least in the short term to its full integration. However that may be the next challenge in France will be to develop notable efforts for an extensive integration. Marshall (1990) supports a proposal for a better integrated approach concerning safety, occupational health and environmental protection with the constraint of social acceptability of the chemical and process industries. The proposition and the experience of Lemkowitz (1992) in the Delft University of Technology with the development of a unique program for integrating health, safety, environment and social aspects into chemical engineering education will be helpful for the potential application in France. The same author extends this multidisciplinary basically societal approach in relation with the concept of sustainability (Lemkowitz et al., 1999; Lemkowitz et al., 2000a and Lemkowitz et al., 2000b) .
At present we try to generate thoughts and opinions among the teachers to introduce an initiation We tested first as introduction a simple approach proposed in the literature with the help of two safety and environmental scenarios that pose ethical problems (Mascone et al., 1991a and Mascone et al., 1991b) . At the beginning of a course the students were asked to fill out two survey questionnaires; next they discussed the scenarios and the obtained answers in interaction with the session moderated by the teacher. The goal of the discussion was to get the students to consider and discuss the consequences of the various alternative actions. The evaluation of the session was useful but too pedagogically limited.
A more complete example of that opportunity was discussed in detail by Ocone (2005) Finally what do we know and propose about the safety ethic? At the present time we try to apply the cohesive model of the safety ethic identified by Hill (2003) . This model recapitulates the five following elements:
I value safety as a positive, integral part of my every day activities I work safely by minimizing risks of injury and illness
I prevent at risk behaviour whenever I encounter it
I promote safety to others whenever possible I accept responsibility for safety as a free act of caring for others
The detailed content of these elements is described in the reference (Hill, 2003) . This simple model for the safety ethic provides the opportunity to strive to a new level of attention to safety.
In conclusion, for the future French safety education, the potential application of several trends (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001) . (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001) . (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001) . (Laurent, 1999; Perilhon et al., 2001 ).
Figure (2) -Illustration of the systemic MADS model

Figure (3) -Schematic view of the reference model of hazard process
